

DOA-GAN: Dual-Order Attentive GAN for Image Copy-Move Forgery Detection and Localization

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
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*This work was supervised by Chengjiang Long when Ashraful Islam was a summer intern at Kitware Inc.

Problem and Objective






- Very challenging to distinguish copy-move from the frequent, incidental similarities
- Goal: Automatically detect and localize the source (green) and the forged (red) regions in forged images

Contributions




- We propose a dual-order attentive Generative Adversarial Network for image copymove forgery detection and localization.
- The 1st-order attention module extracts copy-move location aware attention map and the 2nd-order attention module explores patch-to-patch inter-dependence.
- Extensive experiments strongly demonstrate that the proposed DOA-GAN clearly outperforms state-of-the-art (BusterNet, DenseField, 3D PatchMatch, and others).










Visualization of the 1st-order attention on two copy-move forgery images.

DOA-GAN Framework





Quantitative and Qualitative Result



CASIA


| | Methods | Year | Precision | Recall | Fl |
|-----|--------------|------|-----------|--------|-------|
| | Block-ZM | 2010 | 68.97 | 53.69 | 60.38 |
| Det | DCT-Match | 2012 | 63.74 | 46.31 | 53.46 |
| | Adaptive-Seg | 2015 | 93.07 | 25.59 | 40.14 |
| | DenseFiled | 2015 | 99.51 | 30.61 | 46.82 |
| | BusterNet | 2018 | 48.34 | 75.12 | 58.82 |
| | DOA-GAN | 2020 | 63.39 | 77.00 | 69.53 |
| | Block-ZM | 2010 | 10.09 | 3.01 | 3.30 |
| | DCT-Match | 2012 | 8.80 | 1.90 | 2.40 |
| Laa | Adaptive-Seg | 2015 | 23.17 | 5.14 | 7.42 |
| Loc | DenseField | 2015 | 20.55 | 20.91 | 20.36 |
| | BusterNet | 2018 | 42.15 | 30.54 | 33.72 |
| | DOA-GAN | 2020 | 54.70 | 39.67 | 41.44 |
| | | • | | | |

Year

Precision

| | | Block-ZM | 2010 | 51.72 | 20.87 | 29.74 |
|---------|-----|--------------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| | Det | DCT-Match | 2012 | 50.48 | 29.77 | 37.46 |
| | | Adaptive-Seg | 2015 | 65.66 | 43.37 | 52.24 |
| | | DenseField | 2015 | 80.34 | 20.10 | 32.15 |
| CoMoFoD | | BusterNet | 2018 | 53.20 | 57.41 | 55.22 |
| | | DOA-GAN | 2020 | 60.38 | 65.98 | 63.05 |
| | | Block-ZM | 2010 | 2.90 | 2.50 | 1.73 |
| | Loc | DCT-Match | 2012 | 3.53 | 3.41 | 2.03 |
| | | Adaptive-Seg | 2015 | 23.02 | 13.27 | 13.46 |
| | | DenseField | 2015 | 22.23 | 23.63 | 22.60 |
| | | BusterNet | 2018 | 51.25 | 28.20 | 35.34 |
| | | DOA-GAN | 2020 | 48.42 | 37.84 | 36.92 |

Methods




Recall


F1

Robustness Analysis






Invariance Analysis on our self-collected dataset



Number of correctly detected images on CoMoFoD




F1 scores on CoMoFoD under attacks

Extension to Other Manipulations



Image Splicing Localization

| Method | | Source | ; | | Target | |
|-------------|------|--------|------|------|--------|------|
| Method | IoU | F1 | MCC | IoU | F1 | MCC |
| DMVN | 37.2 | 48.4 | 32.3 | 42.0 | 53.5 | 36.7 |
| DMAC | 76.5 | 81.2 | 76.7 | 85.6 | 90.0 | 85.2 |
| DOA-GAN | 86.4 | 91.0 | 86.2 | 92.4 | 95.4 | 91.8 |



Video Copy-move Localization

| Method | F1 Score | | | IoU | | |
|-----------------|----------|------|------|------|-------|------|
| Method | S | T | Α | S | T | Α |
| PatchMatch [11] | - | - | 11.7 | - | - | 9.8 |
| DMVN | 27.2 | 33.8 | 37.2 | 20.5 | 25.76 | 27.3 |
| DMAC | 39.5 | 39.0 | 45.2 | 31.1 | 30.5 | 35.3 |
| DOA-GAN | 62.9 | 62.3 | 65.0 | 50.7 | 49.6 | 53.3 |







Input Video

DOA-GAN

Truth



Paper QR Code:

http://www.chengjianglong.com/publications/DOAGAN_CVPR.pdf



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